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Comment
Earnings Management as a Professional
Responsibility Problem
William H. Simon*
Not infrequently, managers of public companies propose to do thingsrearrange their operations, restructure assets and liabilities, sell and buy

property-solely for the purpose of achieving accounting effects they desire.
Most often they want an increase in current reported earnings per share, though

sometimes they prefer a current decrease in the earnings they would otherwise
report when it will allow them to show a smoothly increasing pattern of

earnings in the future.
Sometimes the desired effects require outright lying or violations of
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), in which cases the maneuvers are plainly illegal. But even where they do not involve lying or GAAP

violations, "earnings management" activities are at best wasteful and at worst
misleading. Why should lawyers assist in them? Why do the bar or the courts
not adopt a maxim that, where it appears that a manager's sole or dominant
purpose in undertaking an activity is to achieve favorable accounting effects
(that is, accounting effects that make management look good), the lawyer has a
duty to advise against and refuse to assist it? Another way to frame the
principle would be to insist that management articulate a prima facie plausible

business purpose for an activity for which it asks the lawyer's assistance.'
Although earnings management has come in for a good deal of criticism
2
lately, no one has suggested that lawyers have any duty as broad as this one.

Lawyers routinely assist with various kinds of earnings management. So
Steven Schwarcz seems to reflect the prevailing assumption among practitioners in arguing that such assistance should not be regarded as presumptively

*

Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.

1. It might be questioned whether such a duty would have significant practical effects. Perhaps
managers would be willing and able to invent minimally plausible business rationales for most of
the activities they wished to undertake. On the other hand, perhaps some managers would be
deterred simply by the knowledge that they had a duty not to proceed in the absence of a business
purpose, and perhaps lawyers would sometimes be able to distinguish patently pretextual purposes
from legitimate ones. Without some experience at trying to implement the principle, it is hard to
say what its effects would be. The question of effect, however, is relevant only if we accept the
prior principle that there is something presumptively wrong with earnings management. So I focus
here on that question.
2. E.g., Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the
Earnings Game, J. APPLIED CORP. FiN., Winter 2002, at 41.
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wrongful. 3 Nevertheless, there is a substantial argument that a rule of
presumptive prohibition would be most consistent with both the securities
laws and the lawyer's fiduciary duty to her corporate client.
Considering the arguments against professional assistance to earnings
management may shed some light on Schwarcz's analysis of lawyer opinions
in structured-finance and other transactions.
This is a pioneering
contribution, but it disappoints on precisely the point to which its title draws
attention-in delineating the "limits" of the lawyer's discretion to assist the
corporate client. We can all agree with Schwarcz that lawyer assistance to
transactions involving explicit deception is inappropriate.4 At the other end
of the spectrum, Schwarcz is only slightly more controversial when he argues
that a lawyer should not be prohibited from assisting a lawful leveraged buyout just because it entails loss of jobs. 5 But if we are concerned with
"limits," we should focus on activities that are less obviously illegal than the
former but more directly implicate the lawyer's expertise and responsibilities
than the latter. Earnings management is an especially fruitful example.
Schwarcz's main reason for opposing presumptive prohibition of
assistance to earnings management activities is that such activities are not
categorically illegal.6 If we think they are bad, he says, then we should just
ban the underlying transactions before limiting lawyers' discretion to assist
them.7 So the "limit of lawyering" turns out to be the law. I find both the
premise and the conclusion of this argument more ambiguous and debatable
than Schwarcz does. Before we locate the limits of lawyering in the "law,"
we need to explain what we mean by law, and this requires consideration of
some issues that Schwarcz elides. And when we turn to the relevant
doctrine, the case for a presumptive prohibition of earnings management,
while not beyond debate, seems considerably stronger than Schwarcz allows.
I consider these points in turn.
I.

Two Concepts of Law

Schwarcz's article invokes the idea of law in at least two distinct senses.
One is purposive or functional; one is positivist or predictive. Each has
different implications for the limits of lawyering.
The purposive or functional conception underlies Schwarcz's conditions
for third-party opinions: The lawyer should demand reasonable
substantiation of the factual premises on which he has been asked to opine.8
If the transaction as a whole is complex, he should not be obliged to

3. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84
TEXAS L. REv. 1, 3 (2005).

4. Id. at 5-6.
5. Id. at 28.
6. Id. at 27-28, 31-32.
7. Id. at 32.

8. Id. at 18 n.98.

2005]

Earnings Management

investigate all its aspects. 9 He should, however, follow up with respect to
"red flags" that signal the possibility of illegality.' 0 In cases of doubt, he
may ask inside counsel for an opinion that the transaction as a whole conforms to law; a refusal to give such an opinion, unaccompanied by 11
a
persuasive reason, is a strong indication that the lawyer should not assist.
In any event, where it is clear that the transaction involves illegality, the
lawyer should not give the requested opinion, even if, considered alone, it
would be accurate. 12
How does Schwarcz derive these principles? He cites no specific
statutory or case law support for them. His most pertinent cites are from
reports of bar associations that have no formal lawmaking power, but which
have given extensive (and in some respects, disinterested) consideration to
the matter. He also invokes the general social goal of economic efficiency,
and specifically, the reduction of information asymmetries. And he implies
that his precepts would complement a variety of legal rules that govern
structured-finance transactions, for example, bankruptcy, contract, and
securities law, by inducing practice likely to effectuate their purposes of
promoting mutually beneficial collaboration and exchange.
Thus, Schwarcz's framework derives its plausibility from (a) its
consistency with the views of informed practitioners, (b) its tendency to
further the underlying purposes of a variety of laws, and (c) its harmony with
the basic social value of economic efficiency.
To be sure, it might be possible for Schwarcz to argue that his precepts
are supported by law in a narrower sense. He could point to court cases
holding lawyers liable for failing, for example, to do "due diligence" with
respect to some factual premise of an opinion. Many of these cases,
however, would lead us back to a more informal conception of law grounded
in social practices and values. Much professional liability is premised on
standards of practice developed within professional communities. These
standards become law in the narrow sense when they are incorporated by
some liability norm, such as the duty of care, but this happens only after and
because they have been recognized as binding in informal social processes.
The narrower conception of law appears most clearly in Schwarcz's
article when he discusses the kinds of concerns that should require a lawyer
to refuse to assist in a transaction. 13 Schwarcz wants to limit his prohibition
to transactions involving illegality, with the term now understood in a
14
positivist,
sense.
From
perspective,
legality
of a
transaction predictive
turns on the
likelihood
thatthis
a state
institutionthe
with
jurisdiction

9. Id. at 18.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id at 17.
Id. at 33-44.
Id. at 33.
Id at 33-34.
Id. at41.
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over the matter will or would prohibit it. Because he does not consider it
illegal in this positivist sense, Schwarcz does not regard earnings management as presumptively suspect. Under this second narrow conception of law,
it is not important (a) that the practice is inconsistent with the considered
judgments of informed practitioners, (b) that it frustrates the underlying
purposes of relevant surrounding law, or (c) that it is economically
inefficient.
As a guide to professional practice, this second conception of law has
some critical ambiguities. Let me mention just two. First, it is not clear what
the relevant prediction is. Are we supposed to predict whether a state
institution will actually prohibit the practice, or whether a state institution
would prohibit it if it had the opportunity to review it? The likelihood of
actual prohibition depends in part on such matters as whether the conduct is
ever discovered and whether those with standing to challenge it have the
resources to do so. Many would consider these factors irrelevant to the
legality of the conduct, but some lawyers see no problem in taking advantage
of them. Some tax lawyers, for example, think it is legitimate to take advantage of the IRS's limited enforcement resources to play the "audit lottery."' 15
Second, how reliable or specific does the prediction have to be before a
prohibition is binding? Does there have to be a rule or case with a prohibition that describes the exact conduct in question? Or is it enough that the
relevant authority prohibits analogous conduct or lays down general principles that apply to our case? The reductio ad absurdem of the former position
is the argument of a few criminal defense lawyers that their duty of respect
for law requires them to comply with the Internal Revenue Code requirement
that they report large cash payments from their
clients only if and when they
6
are individually ordered to do so by a court.'
An only slightly less extreme version of this perspective is the claim of
the Kaye, Scholer firm, repeated here by Schwarcz, that the charges of misconduct by the Office of Thrift Supervision arising from the firm's
representation of Lincoln Savings & Loan in the 1980s represented
"retroactive" lawmaking.' 7 In fact, most of the charges were applications of
long-established tort principles to a situation that, while novel in some
respects, involved precisely
the kind of social stakes the principles were
8
designed to protect.'

15. See John D. Dorocak, PotentialPenalties and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position:Not
Reporting Gain on the Expiration ofa SCIN After Estate of Franc v. Commissioner, 23 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 217, 245 (1998) (concluding that it is within the legal rules of ethics for a lawyer to discuss
the "audit lottery" with a client).
16. Fred Strasser, Lawyers Must Name Names, NAT'L L. J., June 24, 1991, at 18.

17. Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 39-40.
18. My analysis of the charges concludes:
At least with respect to the duty-of-candor claims, what was new in the Lincoln case
was not the principles but the circumstances. Those who speak about the novelty of
OTS's approach do not point to past bank failures of comparable magnitude involving
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The more the positivist allows for the influence of hypothetical
decisions as well as actual ones, and the more she is willing to predict from
analogy and principle as well as from fully specific rules and cases, the more
this second conception of law blurs with the first, purposivist one.
When he posits a potentially large gulf between law and informal
norms, Schwarcz adopts a relatively narrow, predictive understanding of
law;1 9 one that contemplates that "technical" compliance with disclosure
norms might be sufficient even when there is a likelihood that a report will
be misunderstood. Schwarcz is attracted to this narrower conception because
it promises greater certainty about what one's obligations are. 20 It is
questionable whether lawyers need this kind of certainty. If social norms are
sufficiently developed and appreciated, they should support predictable
judgments. On one conception, making complex judgments from diverse
types of authority represents the most distinctive and valuable lawyering
skill. (The duty of care to clients in malpractice cases is measured basically
in terms of informal norms.) Moreover, whatever certainty the narrow conception of predictive legality would provide lawyers is likely to come at the
cost of reduced certainty for investors. If we are concerned about predictability for investors, the most pertinent norms are those that track investors'
expectations, and these will most likely be a mix of formal legal and informal
social norms.2 1
In addition, the gap between legal duty and informal social norms that
the positivist conception tolerates could mean that lawyers will more often
participate in conduct that will widely be regarded as socially harmful. It
will very likely mean that they will more often participate in conduct that
they themselves would regard, were they encouraged to make a judgment on

similar conduct in which lawyers were treated more leniently. There was nothing
radical about the notion that lawyers ought not to assist fraud. What was new... was
the banking system's vulnerability to fraud.
William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's
Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 269 (1998). For analysis of the
charges, see id. at 246-58, 283-95.
19. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 36-37 (discussing the disconnects between positive law and

social norms).
20. Id. at 39 (concluding that the codification of changing norms into retroactive law
undermines "the certainty and objectivity needed to structure transactions").
21. Here I follow the past century's most uncompromising proponent of legal predictability:
[T]he belief that everyone must be able to foresee the consequences that will
follow in an unforeseen factual situation from an application [of the formal law] is
clearly an illusion.... What has been promulgated or announced beforehand will
often be only a very imperfect formulation of principles which people can better
honour in action than express in words. Only if one believes that all law is an
expression of the will of a legislator and has been invented by him, rather than an
expression of the principles required by the exigencies of a going order, does it
seem that previous announcement is an indispensable condition of knowledge of

the law.
1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 117-18 (1973).
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the matter, as socially harmful. This could damage both their perceived
public legitimacy and their sense of self-respect.
Judge Friendly seemed to have some such notion in mind when he
rejected the narrow conception of legal duty in the securities fraud case of
United States v. Benjamin. Charged with fraud, the accountant defendant
responded that his "pro forma" financial statements were literally accurate
because they only purported to characterize information provided by the
defendant and he did not know the information was false.2 3 Under these
circumstances, he argued, there could be no fraud liability.24 Citing neither
statutes nor cases, but rather finance and accounting manuals, Judge Friendly
responded that the fraud norms of the securities statutes should be interpreted
in the light of the considered practices of the accounting profession, which
required some efforts to verify statements of this kind.2625 To hold otherwise,
he said, "would be insulting an honorable profession.
II.

Two Objections to Earnings Management

We can concede that, in the narrow, predictive view, earnings
management is not categorically prohibited.
(Of course, predictive
judgments are probabilistic. So when we say not prohibited, we mean only
that the probability seems low that this is how the court would rule.) On a
purposive view, however, legality turns not simply on our prediction about
how a court would rule but on our judgment about how it ought to rule.
From this point of view, earnings management seems of doubtful legitimacy
on two grounds. It seems inconsistent with (a) the principles underlying the
securities disclosure rules, and (b) the fiduciary duties of both lawyers and
management to the organization.
The intuition that there is something presumptively wrong with earnings
management under the securities laws is straightforward. Investors are likely
to interpret changes in a corporation's reported accounting measures as indicators of changes in its business operations. These figures are mandated in
order to guide investment decisions. 27 They are produced by auditors
ostensibly independent of management for the purpose of "fairly and
accurately" reflecting the business condition of the company. An accounting
practice of basing reported earnings on business operations undertaken independently of accounting effects is more consistent with the expectations this
22. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
23. Id.at 860.
24. Id.
25. Id.at 861.
26. Id.
27. See Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the purpose of securities disclosure provisions "is not to tip the scales in favor of management or its
opponents but to insure that a public shareholder, confronted by a cash tender for his stock, can
obtain adequate information about the qualifications and intentions of the offering party before
responding to the offer").
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situation encourages than one that permits management to affect reported
numbers through activities that have no business purpose.
The manager who proposes the earnings management transaction may
believe that the accounting effect he is striving to produce would better reflect the financial condition of the company than the numbers that would be
generated without the transaction, but he will usually have a strong bias that
should lead us to doubt his judgment on the matter. It is also true that, if
earnings management is permitted and investors know that it is, they will
expect it and will discount earnings figures accordingly. This practice,
however, is likely to be overbroad and socially inefficient. Since investors
don't know who is engaging in the practice, they will discount stocks of
companies that do not engage in it as well as those that do. Moreover, from
the point of view of fairness to investors, excusing deceptive manipulation on
the ground that investors expect it is like saying that a mugging victim "was
asking for it" because he went walking in a questionable part of town.
Schwarcz suggests that financial statement figures are the responsibility
of accountants, and that if the auditor has no objection to management's
maneuver, the lawyer should have no responsibility to make a further
judgment before proceeding to assist. 28 As Schwarcz recognizes, however,
this advice cannot apply where the accounting standards themselves require
lawyers to make judgments as a precondition of a certain treatment. Enron is
a notable example. The standard applicable to special purpose entities conditioned off-balance-sheet treatment of debt on a lawyers' opinion that the
transaction was a "true sale."2 9
Moreover, although the point seems to have been forgotten during the
boom of the 1990s, compliance with GAAP does not excuse otherwise misleading reporting. 30 Even where lawyer deference to auditor judgments
about GAAP requirements would make sense, deference to judgments about
what is misleading might not. In the category of cases we are talking about,
the absence of "business purpose" is a red flag that requires no great
expertise to recognize.
Aside from the securities laws, both lawyer and manager have a
fiduciary duty under state law to the corporation. This duty embraces the
shareholders' interest in accurate financial reporting. Fiduciary standards are
generally more exacting than conventional legal duties. Thus, assuming that
a substantial range of earnings management is permitted by the securities

28. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 47 ("In contrast to an accountant whose responsibility is to
fairly present financial statements, the opining lawyer's sole duty is to present an accurate, fair, and
objective opinion on the legal matters the opinion covers.").
29. Id

at 2 n.8; see generally ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL

ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140

(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000) (stating the rules on off-balance-sheet transactions at the time
of the later Enron deals).

30. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1969);
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 610-11 (4th ed. 2002).

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE
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laws, it might still be inconsistent with corporate fiduciary duty. If financial
reporting without earnings management better serves shareholder interests,
then fiduciaries should forgo these practices.
Schwarcz's answer to this claim seems to deny that shareholders have
an interest in the most accurate possible financial reporting. In an interesting
related article, he argues that, under state corporation law, fiduciary duties
embrace the interests of current shareholders, not future shareholders.3 1
Current shareholders are prospective sellers, and as such do not have an
interest in the disclosure of information that would lower the stock price. 32 If
earnings management pumps up the stock price, that is in the interests of current shareholders. On this view, more active fraud would also be in the
interests of shareholders, but that is forbidden by securities and tort law.
Schwarcz's point is that fiduciary duty does not do any additional work in the
financial reporting area and should not be interpreted to expand disclosure
duties.
The argument is ingenious, but I find it unconvincing. In the first place,
Schwarcz's claim that state law does not include the interests of prospective
shareholders within the ambit of corporate fiduciary duties is debatable. The
relevant authority is skimpy, sometimes ambiguous, and does not specifically
address the issues we are considering. It would be more accurate to say that
state law leaves the matter open.33
Second, even if fiduciary duty only embraces current shareholder
interests, it seems unlikely that those interests are consistent with earnings
management. Short-term shareholders may get a better price because of its
cosmetic effects, but long-term shareholders are likely to suffer if the practice is detected and the firm's reputation for accurate reporting is
compromised.
More importantly, all current shareholders have a stake in the
corporation's mechanisms of managerial accountability, and financial
reporting plays a crucial role in these mechanisms. Giving managers

31. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and
Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1049 (2005) ("Corporation law suggests the audience
should be current investors. Directors and management, at least in the United States, have a
fiduciary duty only to investors holding an existing property right or equitable interest to support
such a duty-i.e., current investors.").
32. Id. ("[L]ess prominent disclosure of risk ... helps current investors preserve the value of
their investments.").
33. There is some support for the notion that a corporation has a duty to disclose information
distinctively relevant to prospective shareholders in Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1947), and its sequel, Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 186-94 (D. Del. 1955),
modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). These cases hold that, while the corporation did not owe a
duty to holders of convertible preferred shares that would require the corporation to forgo exercising
a contractual redemption privilege, it did have a duty to disclose information helpful to the holders
in deciding whether to exercise their conversion privilege, even though such disclosure was not
contractually required and was disadvantageous to the common shareholders.
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discretion over financial reporting issues is like allowing students to grade
their own tests.
III. Conclusion
The "limits of lawyering" are the constraints of law, but having said
that, the question remains-what do we mean by law? If we take a narrow,
predictive conception of law, the limits will be less restrictive than if we take
a broader, purposive view. Schwarcz's analysis seems inconsistent. He implies a broader conception of legality in prescribing due-diligence principles
for lawyers, but he then veers toward a narrower one in arguing for discretion
to assist conduct that violates the spirit but not the clear terms of the
securities laws.
Earnings management practice is a good test of the difference between
the two conceptions. Schwarcz's argument that there is nothing presumptively wrong with it rests on the narrower conception. On a more ambitious
conception of legality, earnings management should be viewed as presumptively wrong. The more ambitious conception is most compatible with the
idea of lawyering as a dignified calling.

